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GOING … GOING … PUBLIC? TAKING A 
UNITED STATES PROFESSIONAL 
SPORTS LEAGUE PUBLIC 
IAN A. MCLIN  
ABSTRACT 
The four major American professional sports leagues—the 
MLB, NBA, NHL, and NFL—are wildly popular, but the leagues 
fail to capitalize fully on their success because they are organized 
in a largely inefficient manner. By organizing as unincorporated 
non-profits, leagues forgo their ability to raise capital via inves-
tors, forcing taxpayers to bear the burden of league investments 
such as new stadium construction. Further, the current organiza-
tional model creates a collective action problem, as self-interested 
team owners focus their support on actions that benefit their own 
franchise and leave ineffective commissioners in power. 
A solution to these problems is for a professional sports league 
to incorporate and organize as a publicly traded company. The ap-
plication of the corporate model to the sports world is not a new 
concept—several individual franchises have “gone public” over the 
years. But, because of concerns arising from the fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty, the corporate model is much more viable for an 
entire league rather than an individual team. 
                                                                                                            
 The author is a J.D. Candidate at William & Mary Law School; B.A. Uni-
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Catherine McLin, for their unwavering support and encouragement throughout 
his education. He also thanks the staff of the William & Mary Business Law 
Review for their tireless effort in preparing this Note for publication.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Professional sports dominate today’s world. Entire networks, 
radio channels, and websites dedicate twenty-four seven coverage 
to the latest trade, hiring or firing of coaches, or injury. Even the 
slightest of scandals sends the media into a frenzy, as fans demand 
details about their favorite or least favorite athletes.1 The near-
communal watching of large-scale sporting events such as the Super 
Bowl has become somewhat of a national pastime.2 The National 
Football League (NFL) practically “owns a day of the week.”3 
Yet, in America’s four major professional sports leagues—the 
NFL, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball As-
sociation (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL)—it is 
the team owners that benefit financially from the rising popularity 
of sports in today’s world.4 Owners have virtually infinite power to 
operate their teams in the manner that most pleases them,5 often 
to the dismay of fans.6 Moreover, despite the popularity of each 
                                                                                                            
1 See, e.g., Eric Wilbur, #Deflategate, and the Stupidity Surrounding It, Has 
Reached Its Fever Pitch, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.boston 
.com/sports/columnists/wilbur/2015/01/deflategate_stupidity_has_reached_its 
_fever_pitch.html [https://perma.cc/ZT43-AT3B]. 
2 See Henry D. Fetter, Super Bowl: More Proof That Football Is America’s 
Real Favorite Pastime, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/entertainment/archive/2012/02/super-bowl-more-proof-that-football-is-americas 
-real-favorite-pastime/252500/ [https://perma.cc/G2ZR-VF62]. 
3 CONCUSSION (Columbia Pictures 2015). Concussion portrays Dr. Bennet 
Omalu’s advocacy concerning the long-lasting effects resulting from repeated 
concussions. Id. In the film, a fellow doctor warns Omalu not to take on the 
NFL: “You’re going to war with a corporation that owns a day of the week.” Id. 
4 League profits are distributed among team owners. See MARK CONRAD, 
THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS: A PRIMER FOR JOURNALISTS 14 (2d ed. 2011). 
5 Owners have “complete decision-making authority within the team” and 
are “able to hire and fire all staff, including players, if they so desire.” 1 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF SPORTS MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING 1067 (Linda E. Swayne & 
Mark Dodds eds. 2011). 
6 Such complete authority often results in resentment from fans in light of 
an owner’s poor decision-making. See, e.g., Ian Begley, Knicks Fans Organize 
Protest, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2014), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nba/story/_/id/1056 
1854/new-york-knicks-fans-stage-protest-madison-square-garden-game [https:// 
perma.cc/M38R-Q2H6] (describing a planned protest of New York Knicks 
owner James Dolan for a “systematic and consistently recurring lack of respon-
sible decision-making”); Jason Epstein, Redskins Fans Really Don’t Like Dan 
Snyder, NAT. REV.: RIGHT FIELD (Dec. 12, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://www.national 
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league, a significant portion of the financial responsibility for 
large-scale investments, such as new stadiums, is placed upon the 
local taxpayer, not the wealthy owner.7 
This Note examines whether professional sports leagues should 
become publicly traded corporations. In doing so, Part I first dis-
cusses the popular proposal among academics that individual 
sports franchises should incorporate and “go public,”8 ultimately 
rejecting such a proposal due to legal concerns surrounding the 
ability of a publicly traded franchise’s board of directors to comply 
with the necessary fiduciary duties. Part II explains how the con-
cerns surrounding directors’ fiduciary duties in the context of in-
dividual sports franchises pose no such problem in the context of 
a publicly traded sports league. Finally, Part III examines the ben-
efits of an incorporated sports league. These benefits include: the 
promotion of more efficient behavior via elimination of the collective 
action problem that currently plagues each of the major profes-
sional sports leagues, a massive influx of capital via initial public 
offering (IPO), and additional future opportunities for capital in-
fusion through the issuance of new shares. Such capital infusions 
may remove the burden on local taxpayers to pay for increasingly 
expensive new stadiums and grow the opportunity for leagues to 
expand into new markets in our increasingly globalized world.9 
I. PUBLICLY TRADED INDIVIDUAL SPORTS FRANCHISES 
Nearly all of the scholarship examining the application of the 
corporate model to sports has revolved around the concept of a 
                                                                                                            
review.com/right-field/394693/redskins-fans-really-dont-dan-snyder-jason-epstein 
[https://perma.cc/AZF3-LWBU] (discussing how Washington Redskins fans are 
so disgruntled with owner Dan Snyder that 82 percent of poll respondents would 
support a plan to move the Redskins to Los Angeles if it meant Washington 
could start over with a new expansion team within three years); ‘Free the birds’: 
Orioles Fans Walk Out in Protest, ESPN (Sept. 21, 2006), http://sports.espn.go 
.com/mlb/news/story?id=2597721 [https://perma.cc/MJM7-VCRH] (describing a 
demonstration involving a mass exodus of fans from a Baltimore Orioles base-
ball game in protest of owner Peter Angelos). 
7 KEVIN J. DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS: 
THE BATTLE OVER BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS 25–26 (2003). 
8 See generally infra note 10.  
9 See infra Section III.B.   
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publicly traded sports team, rather than a league.10 This is likely 
the result of the fact that there is some precedent for a publicly 
traded sports franchise, as, over time, several major American 
sports franchises have conducted IPOs.11 Most notably, the Cleve-
land Indians listed four million shares on the NASDAQ in 1998, ul-
timately raising more than sixty million dollars.12 The Boston Celtics 
operated as a publicly owned franchise for almost twenty years, 
from 1986 to 2002.13 Other teams have flirted with community-
based ownership, such as the Green Bay Packers who raised almost 
twenty-four million dollars in 1997 through the issuance of more 
than one hundred thousand shares.14 
However, despite the relative success of the above franchises 
in issuing shares, other franchises have not followed suit.15 These 
                                                                                                            
10 See, e.g., Robert Bacon, Comment, Initial Public Offerings and Professional 
Sports Teams: The Regulations Work, but are Owners and Investors Listening?, 
10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 139, 140–41 (2000) (arguing that the 1933 and 
1934 Securities and Exchange Acts deter individual team IPOs due to fears 
concerning public disclosure of financial information); Brian R. Cheffins, Play-
ing the Stock Market: “Going Public” and Professional Team Sports, 24 J. CORP. 
L. 641, 658, 660, 662 (1999) (suggesting that, while going public may be a pop-
ular notion in sports, owners are likely to be hesitant due to disclosure require-
ments, the cost of establishing an IPO, and the loss of autonomy that comes 
with running a public corporation); Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, 
Considerations for Professional Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2010); Zachary A. Greenberg, Note, Tossing the 
Red Flag: Official (Judicial) Review and Shareholder-Fan Activism in the Con-
text of Publicly Traded Sports Teams, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1255, 1292 (2013) 
(predicting that, despite the drawbacks of disclosure and several unresolved 
legal issues, the “sports team corporation model ... should continue to gain mo-
mentum” due to the “limitless opportunity for capital infusion into the fran-
chise”); Ryan Schaffer, Note, A Piece of the Rock (or the Rockets): The Viability 
of Widespread Public Offerings of Professional Sports Franchises, 5 VA. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 201, 231 (2006) (concluding that public offerings of individual 
sports teams are viable and focusing on the benefit of a publicly traded team’s 
ability to finance their team through equity, rather than through debt). 
11 See Bacon, supra note 10, at 146–52. 
12 SCOTT R. ROSNER & KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 
35 (2d ed. 2011). 
13 GIL FRIED & TIMOTHY D. MONDELLO, SPORT FINANCE 183 (3d ed. 2013). 
14 Id. at 182. 
15 Chad Fraser, 3 Pro Sports Stocks That Could Score You Big Profits, STREET 
(Oct. 1, 2015, 11:35 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13307581/1/3-pro 
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franchises are correct to not follow, as the fiduciary constraints 
that the law places on board members of publicly traded corpo-
rations make the corporate model incongruous to an individual 
franchise.16 
A. The Duty of Care 
A corporation’s directors have a duty of care to act in the cor-
poration’s best business interests.17 In making a decision, direc-
tors must “act … on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”18 However, the business judgment rule typically pro-
tects the directors’ ultimate decision from examination.19 Courts 
will generally defer to directors’ exercise of business judgment, 
rather than “second-guess” the decision ex post.20 This is because 
the directors’ “function is to encounter risks and to confront un-
certainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a 
wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect 
knowledge.”21 
Despite the business judgment rule’s power as an affirmative 
defense, courts have found that directors violate their duty of care 
when they “openly eschew … stockholder wealth maximization.”22 
In the seminal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford, 
as director, sought to use company profits to expand production 
and cut prices rather than release dividends to stockholders.23 
                                                                                                            
-sports-stocks-that-could-score-you-big-profits.html [https://perma.cc/G4L3-T8XR] 
(noting that as of the date of writing, only four teams have traded publicly in 
the U.S.).  
16 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000) (presuming that 
corporation’s directors must act in the best interest of the company); see also 
infra Section I.A (explaining why the corporate model is incongruous to an in-
dividual franchise).  
17 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
18 Id. 
19 Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as Immunity Doctrine, 4 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521, 526 (2013). 
20 Id. at 527. 
21 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d. Cir. 1982). 
22 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
23 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919). 
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The court found that it was unlawful for directors “to shape and 
conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit 
of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others,” 
and that it would be a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties to 
“sacrifice the interests of shareholders.”24 
A more recent case, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 
furthered the doctrine of shareholder primacy.25 There, Craig 
Newmark and James Buckmaster were majority shareholders 
and board members of Craigslist, Inc.26 Feeling that it was not in 
the firm’s “culture” to focus on maximizing profits, Newmark and 
Buckmaster adopted a corporate policy that specifically stated the 
corporation’s purpose was not to maximize the company’s value.27 
The court held that such a policy breached Newmark and 
Buckmaster’s fiduciary duties to Craigslist’s shareholders, stating 
that, as a corporation, Craigslist must operate primarily for the 
benefit of its stockholders.28 Therefore, any plan that “openly es-
chews” shareholder primacy breaches the fiduciary duty of care.29  
Consequently, any sports franchise seeking to incorporate 
would have to operate in a profit-maximizing capacity.30 Although 
one may think that winning games and making money are closely 
intertwined (after all, it would make sense that the more games a 
team wins, the more fans it draws, and the more tickets and mer-
chandise it sells), it may not be that simple.31 Academics are split 
on whether sports franchises typically act in a win-maximizing or 
profit-maximizing capacity.32 
                                                                                                            
24 Id. at 684. 
25 See eBay, 16 A.3d at 35. 
26 Id. at 6. 
27 Id. at 35. 
28 Id. at 34. 
29 Id. at 35. 
30  If a sports franchise incorporated and operated with a plan that “openly 
eschew[ed]” shareholder primacy it would violate eBay. See id.   
31 PAUL DOWNWARD & ALISTAIR DAWSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL 
TEAM SPORTS 30 (2002).  
32 Compare Mohamed El-Hodiri & James Quirk, An Economic Model of a 
Professional Sports League, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1302, 1305 (1971) (stating the goal 
of most team owners is profit maximization), with RODNEY D. FORT & JAMES 
QUIRK, PAY DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 279 (1997) (find-
ing that “the profit maximization model is inapplicable”), and Peter J. Sloane, 
The Economics of Professional Football: the Football Club as a Utility Maximiser, 
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Similar to the directors of Craigslist, team owners seem un-
likely to admit that the team’s primary interest is profit.33 Even 
when asked specifically about the business goals of a team, own-
ers are likely to defer, such as when Baltimore Orioles owner Peter 
Angelos stated, “I … didn’t go into it thinking that this could be 
run like you run a widget factory. I consider myself a trustee to 
an asset. I don’t think we own the Orioles. I think the people of 
Baltimore do.”34 Similarly, Los Angeles Angels owner Arte Moreno 
has stated that he is more concerned with winning than making 
a profit, even admitting that he dropped concession prices due to 
concerns that it is “unaffordable to come to a ball game.”35 Former 
Oakland Athletics owner Walter Haas, Jr. was “more of a philan-
thropist than a businessman” and sought primarily to operate his 
team in a manner that would create a kind of civic pride among 
Oaklanders.36 In each of these scenarios, owners  expressed that 
they had forgone maximizing the franchise’s profit—actions that 
would be per se duty of care violations under Dodge and eBay.37 
There have been a number of specific situations when owners 
of a sports franchise would have violated their duty to maximize 
the corporation’s profits had their franchises been organized as a 
publicly traded corporation.38 One such situation is where an owner 
                                                                                                            
18 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 121, 135 (1971) (arguing that in some scenarios, own-
ers are likely to pursue utility maximization over profit-maximization); see also 
Rodney D. Fort & James Quirk, Owner Objectives and Competitive Balance, 5 
J. SPORTS ECON. 20, 29 (2004) (concluding that it is extremely difficult to dis-
cern whether an owner is operating in a profit-maximizing or win-maximizing 
capacity). 
33 Tom Van Riper, Today’s Sports Owners: It’s Not About Winning, It’s About 
Business, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2013, 1:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvan 
riper/2013/03/02/todays-sports-owners-its-not-about-winning-its-about-business 
/print/ [https://perma.cc/D8QA-7WQ5]. 
34 Hyman et al., The Orioles’ New Owners, BALT. SUN (Oct. 5, 1993), http:// 
www.baltimoresun.com/sports/horse-racing/bal-mckay100593-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/D236-JHLP]. 
35 Brian Shactman, Billionaire Baseball Owner Putting Wins Over Profit, 
CNBC (Mar. 7, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100534102 [https:// 
perma.cc/UN84-MHG6]. 
36 MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 57 
(2003). 
37 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
38 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (explaining the fiduciary duty to maximize 
corporate profits).   
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elects to stay in their current city rather than move to a more 
profitable location.39 For example, former Oakland Athletics owner 
Walter Haas, Jr. purchased the Athletics in 1980 largely to keep 
the team in Oakland.40 When Haas decided to sell the Athletics 
in 1994, he offered a below market price to any potential buyer 
willing to keep the Athletics in town.41  
Other owners have been similarly unwilling to move their 
team. For example, there was no NFL team in Los Angeles—the 
second-largest market in the country—for twenty years prior to 
the recent relocation of the St. Louis Rams and planned relocation 
of the San Diego Chargers.42 Even then, only three NFL teams 
were even interested in moving to Los Angeles,43 and four of the 
six least valuable NFL franchises were uninterested.44 Other 
than the Rams and the Chargers, of the more than 130 professional 
sports franchises in the four major professional sports leagues, 
only three—the Washington Nationals (relocating from Montreal), 
the Oklahoma City Thunder (relocating from Seattle), and the 
                                                                                                            
39 For an interesting discussion on which cities could financially best sup-
port additional sports teams, see The Cities With Too Few Sports Teams, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2016, 2:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/smartassetcom/the-cities-with-too-many-_b_8020750.html [https://perma.cc 
/CJ7J-6XR3]. 
40 Dwight Chapin, Bay Area Saddened by Walter Haas Death, S.F. GATE 
(Sept. 21, 1995), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Bay-Area-saddened-by-Walter 
-Haas-death-3129783.php [https://perma.cc/JRB7-XR3A]. 
41 Id. 
42 Ken Belson, Rams Moving to Los Angeles Area, and Chargers Could Join 
Them, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/sports 
/football/rams-moving-to-los-angeles-area-and-chargers-could-join-later.html 
[https://perma.cc/3J7H-MB4U] [hereinafter Belson, Rams Moving]; Sam Farmer 
& Nathan Fenno, Double Teamed: Chargers make move to Los Angeles official, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-chargers-move   
-la-20170111-story.html [https://perma.cc/TDA3-EEWL]. The Rams’s value ap-
proximately doubled upon their move to Los Angeles. Ken Belson, Team Locations 
Keep N.F.L. Moving Up Financially, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/sports/football/chargers-los-angeles-san-diego-nfl.html 
[https://perma.cc/YGS8-E93C].  
43 Belson, Rams Moving, supra note 42. 
44 See Ken Belson, NFL to Weigh Three Teams’ Proposals on Moving to Los 
Angeles, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/sports 
/football/nfl-to-weigh-three-teams-proposals-on-moving-to-los-angeles.html?_r 
=0 [https://perma.cc/GWD7-74VZ]. 
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Winnipeg Jets (relocating from Atlanta)—have moved within the 
past ten years, despite the presence of open, larger markets.45  
Other owners are willing to spend far above market value in 
order to ensure they sign certain players.46 For example, infamous 
former New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, in his pur-
suit to acquire the most talented free agents, was well-known for his 
willingness to spend huge sums on players with no concern for 
whether he was signing players for amounts greater than their 
actual market value.47 Ultimately, incorporating would remove 
the ability of those owners to act in such a manner.48 They could 
no longer base their actions upon a philanthropic commitment to 
their particular city; rather, their decisions would be required to 
adhere to the best interests of the corporation.49 While it is cer-
tainly likely that a portion of a team’s stockholders would be made up 
of local fans excited to own a part of their favorite team, diversified 
stockholders are interested in one thing: a profitable portfolio.50 
They would not hesitate to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty should an owner fail to act in a profit-maximizing capacity.51 
B. The Duty of Loyalty 
Board members owe their corporation a duty of loyalty, mean-
ing they have a duty to act with “constant, unqualified fidelity” to 
                                                                                                            
45 ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 240; see also The Cities With 
Too Few Sports Teams, supra note 39. 
46 The highest-paid free agents are the most likely to be overpaid. Duane W. 
Rockerbie, Marginal Revenue Product and Salaries: Moneyball Redux 13, 15 
(Univ. Lethbridge, MPRA Paper No. 21410, 2010), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen 
.de/21410/1/MPRA_paper_21410.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9EF-CQ9A]. 
47 Joe Nocera, Was Steinbrenner Just Lucky? N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/business/17nocera.html [https://perma.cc 
/QM7S-QQZ4]. 
48 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
49 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
50 See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
51 So-called “professional plaintiffs”—investors looking to make money via 
shareholder litigation—have long plagued corporate law. These investors jump 
on any opportunity to sue a corporation for a breach of their fiduciary duty. See 
Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 65 
FLA. L. REV. 1089, 1137–38 (2013). 
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their corporation.52 Two common ways in which directors may 
breach their duty of loyalty are by usurping a corporate oppor-
tunity or by engaging in self-dealing.53 The corporate opportunity 
doctrine holds that a director may not take for himself any inter-
est acquired “for the benefit of the corporation.”54 Further, when 
a corporation has a reasonable expectancy in an opportunity and 
has the financial ability to undertake the opportunity, a director 
may not seize the opportunity for himself.55 
Self-dealing, as the name implies, occurs when directors find 
themselves on both sides of a transaction.56 Specifically, it occurs 
where there is a transaction “between a corporation and [one] or 
more of its directors” or “between a corporation and any other ... 
organization in which [one] or more of its directors ... have a fi-
nancial interest.”57 A self-dealing transaction is presumptively a 
breach of the duty of loyalty.58 A self-interested deal may be san-
itized by approval by a majority of disinterested directors,59 an 
approval by a majority of shareholders,60 or when the entire deal 
is intrinsically fair.61 
Had former Los Angeles Dodgers owner Frank McCourt been 
subject to a duty of loyalty, his actions in usurping a corporate oppor-
tunity almost certainly would have breached that duty.62 In 2011, 
McCourt, on behalf of the Dodgers, negotiated a television agreement 
with Fox, giving Fox the right to televise Dodgers games.63 From the 
agreement, McCourt received a $385 million loan, using eighty 
million dollars of that loan to pay off debts associated with his 
divorce.64 He also received five million dollars designated explicitly 
                                                                                                            
52 Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944). 
53 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1)–(2) (2010) (describing the duty of loyalty). 
54 Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
55 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154 (Del. 1996). 
56 See tit. 8 § 144(a) (describing self-dealing transactions). 
57 Id. 
58 Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6–7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944). 
59 Tit. 8 § 144(a)(1). 
60 § 144(a)(2). 
61 § 144(a)(3). 
62 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996). 
63 Edvard Pettersson, Los Angeles Dodgers Owner, Ex-Wife Settle Divorce 
Dispute, BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2011, 9:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2011-06-17/los-angeles-dodgers-owner-mccourt-settles-divorce-dispute 
-with-ex-wife [https://perma.cc/E5F3-453K]. 
64 Id. 
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for his personal use.65 Thus, McCourt benefited to the tune of 
eighty-five million dollars merely from his position as Dodgers 
owner.66 This money should have belonged to the Dodgers, and 
McCourt’s usurpation of the loan—had the Los Angeles Dodgers 
been a publically traded corporation—would have almost cer-
tainly been a violation of the corporate opportunity doctrine.67 
Similarly, in the early 1990s, the New York Yankees partner-
ship obtained a loan worth one-hundred million dollars, which 
was against the franchise’s lucrative cable contract.68 The part-
nership then agreed to distribute the proceeds of the loan among 
its seventeen partners.69 Majority owner George Steinbrenner used 
his portion of the proceeds to bail out American Ship Building 
Company, of which he was the controlling stockholder.70 Because 
Steinbrenner stood on both sides of the deal, the transaction 
would have been a breach of loyalty unless Steinbrenner took the 
necessary steps to sanitize the deal.71 
                                                                                                            
65 Id. 
66 See id. 
67 Again, an officer usurps a corporate opportunity when he has taken ad-
vantage of a business opportunity and: 
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;  
(2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; 
(3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the oppor-
tunity; and  
(4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary 
will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to 
the corporation. 
Broz, 673 A.2d at 155. The Dodgers—like other sports franchises—frequently 
deal in television contracts and have an expectancy in the profits resulting 
from such deals. McCourt usurped the team’s opportunity to profit. 
68 Jack Curry, BASEBALL; Steinbrenner Defends Loan from TV Contract, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/16/sports/baseball 
-steinbrenner-defends-loan-from-tv-contract.html [https://perma.cc/76QY-RZS5]. 
69 Id. 
70 Allan Sloan, Steinbrenner Waits for his Shipbuilding Firm to Come In, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 1992), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business 
/1992/01/21/steinbrenner-waits-for-his-shipbuilding-firm-to-come-in/c1afc17e 
-daa3-4b4d-91a5-0ce89e002bfb/ [https://perma.cc/8WRR-N3A3]. 
71 Had the Yankees been a public corporation, Steinbrenner could have san-
itized this self-interested transaction by gaining approval by a majority of disin-
terested directors, approval by a majority of the team’s stockholders, or proving 
that the entire transaction was “intrinsically fair”—meaning the deal was both 
 
2017] GOING ... GOING ... PUBLIC? 557 
II. THE CORPORATE MODEL AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 
A. Current Organization 
No American professional sports league has organized itself as 
a publicly traded corporation.72 Rather, each of the four major pro-
fessional sports leagues have remarkably similar governance 
structures.73 Each league operates as an unincorporated non-profit 
association.74 Additionally, an elected commissioner acts as pres-
ident of each league.75 Commissioners have a significant level of job 
security, holding their positions on average for more than fifteen 
years, nearly fifty percent longer than the average corporate Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO).76 The commissioner answers primarily to 
the league’s board of governors—termed the Executive Council in the 
MLB,77 the Executive Committee in the NFL,78 and the Board of Gov-
ernors in the NHL and NBA.79 In the NBA, NFL, and NHL, those 
boards are made up of one representative, usually the owner,80 from 
                                                                                                            
procedurally and substantively fair. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1)–(3) 
(2010); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
72 See CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSO-
CIATION art. 2 (2012) [hereinafter NBA CONSTITUTION]; CONSTITUTION AND 
BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. 2 (2006) [hereinafter NFL 
CONSTITUTION]; CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE art. 2 [here-
inafter NHL CONSTITUTION]; MAJOR LEAGUE CONSTITUTION art. 2.1 (2005) 
[hereinafter MLB CONSTITUTION]. 
73 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2; NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 
72, art. 2; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2; MLB CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 72, art. 2.1. 
74 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2; NFL CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 72, art. 2.2; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 2.2; MLB CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 72, art. 2.1. 
75 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 24; NFL CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 72, art. 8; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 6; MLB CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 72, art. 2. 
76 Eric Chemi, Looking for Job Security? Try Running a Major Sports League, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014 
-09-15/roger-goodell-and-job-security-sports-commissioners-dont-quit [https:// 
perma.cc/T6SV-444J]. 
77 See MLB CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 3 
78 See NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 6. 
79 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 18; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 72, art. 5. 
80 See Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The 
Commissioner and an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 69 (1995). 
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each team.81 Somewhat differently, the MLB’s board is made up 
of the league commissioner and eight “Club [M]embers,” who are 
representatives from four franchises in each of the National and 
American leagues.82 Club members are hand-picked by the commis-
sioner and confirmed by a majority vote of the franchise owners.83 
There is, however, some question as to whether the four major 
professional leagues actually qualify as non-profit unincorporated 
associations (NUAs), or whether they are better labeled as joint 
ventures.84 This is an important—and unresolved—question,85 as 
classification as a joint venture would require owners to exhibit 
different fiduciary duties than would classification as a NUA.86 
Members of joint ventures owe to each other a duty of loyalty87 and 
a duty of care.88 With NUAs, however, laws are somewhat split.89 
The Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations Act 
(RUUNAA), which has been adopted by four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia,90 mandates that managers owe duties of loyalty 
and care to the organization.91 Differently, thirteen states follow 
RUUNAA’s predecessor, the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit 
Associations Act (UUNAA), which does not discuss fiduciary duties.92 
                                                                                                            
81 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 18(b); NFL CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 72, art. 6.1; NHL CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 5.1–5.3. 
82 MLB CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. 3.1. 
83 See id. 
84 See Nadelle Grossman, What is the NBA?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 101, 
126 (2015) (“[T]he NBA may be a partnership, even though there is some basis 
to conclude it is a NUA.”). 
85 See id. at 112. 
86 See id. at 112–13. 
87 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of 
behavior.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997). 
88 REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(c). 
89 See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 23 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2009); see also Elisabeth S. Miller, Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit 
Associations with a Band-Aid or a Body Cast: A Look at the 1996 and 2008 
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Acts, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
852, 853 (2012); Grossman, supra note 84, at 124. 
90 See PERI H. PAKROO, STARTING AND BUILDING A NONPROFIT: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE 16 (Marcia Stewart ed., 6th ed. 2015). 
91 REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 23(a) (2008). 
92 See Miller, supra note 89, at 853, 867. 
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Other states have no statutory law for NUAs, instead relying on 
common law.93 New York—the state in which all four of the power 
four leagues are headquartered—falls into this third category.94 
There, the common law views NUAs as merely contractual rela-
tionships, imposing no fiduciary duties.95 As a result, depending 
upon whether one classifies the four major professional sports 
leagues as joint ventures or as NUAs, the managers within the 
leagues may or may not owe fiduciary duties to the league at large.96 
The remainder of this Note will assume that the leagues are correct 
in classifying themselves as NUAs, but it is important to remem-
ber that managers may already owe the league fiduciary duties. 
B. Fiduciary Duties and a Public Professional Sports League 
The four major professional sports leagues are remarkably 
profitable and, like other profitable entities, have ambitious goals 
for future revenues.97 In 2013, the NFL made $10.5 billion,98 and 
NFL commissioner Roger Goodell recently announced the league 
had set a goal of $25 billion in annual revenues before 2027.99 Simi-
larly, the MLB and new commissioner Rob Manfred recently an-
nounced they hope to reach $15 billion in annual revenues sometime 
in the next few years.100 The focus on revenues and the setting of 
financial goals—as well as the job requirements of expertise in 
                                                                                                            
93 Id. at 853. 
94 Here, New York law is controlling. Each of the four leagues are headquar-
tered in New York, and thus New York has more ties to the leagues’ transactions 
than any other state. See Grossman, supra note 84, at 124. 
95 Id. at 128. 
96 Id. at 126. 
97 See Monte Burke, How The National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion 
In Annual Revenues, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/monteburke/2013/08/17/how-the-national-football-league-can-reach-25   
-billion-in-annual-revenues/ [https://perma.cc/HTY5-AL8S]; Eric Fisher, MLB 
Setting ‘A Big Goal’ of $15 billion in Revenue, SPORTS BUS. J. (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/01/19/Leagues-and-Gov 
erning-Bodies/MLB-owners.aspx [https://perma.cc/WB4U-GYHR]. 
98 Chris Isidore, NFL: Richer than Ever, Despite Controversy, CNN MONEY 
(Sept. 11, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/11/news/companies/nfl 
-revenue-profits/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/DG7S-GJSB?type=image]. 
99 Burke, supra note 97. 
100 See Fisher, supra note 97. 
 
560 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:545 
the areas of economics, negotiation, and lobbying—make the com-
missioner and his surrounding officers’ job descriptions appear 
much like those of a CEO and a corporation’s board of directors.101 
1. The Duty of Care 
While individual team owners may be somewhat likely to 
breach their fiduciary duty of care to the corporation by prioritizing 
winning over finishing in the black,102 the league office suffers 
from no such temptation.103 Team owners are automatically biased 
toward adopting policies that benefit their team, whereas the com-
missioner and his league office act as a neutral governing body.104 
Additionally, like the board of directors of any corporation, one 
of the league office’s primary focuses is profit.105 In order to keep 
the owners who elected the commissioner happy, the league office 
must pursue policies and plans that will maximize returns to the 
owners.106 Even when a league office is under intense public scru-
tiny, such as the NFL and Commissioner Roger Goodell in 2014 
and 2015, it appears that all that matters to owners is profit.107 
                                                                                                            
101 Kevin Allen & Erick Brady, A Commissioner’s Job Description Changes 
With the Times, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2014, 9:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com 
/story/sports/mlb/2014/08/13/commissioner-bud-selig-adam-silver-roger-goodell 
-gary-bettman/14016343/ [https://perma.cc/3RZE-7A2A]. 
102 See supra notes 29, 47–51 and accompanying text. 
103 See David Falk, Are Professional Sports Leagues’ Control Over Their 
Member Teams and Owners in Doubt?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 337, 338–39 (2012) 
(noting that the league is structured to “promote and foster” all teams rather 
than prioritizing one team over another) (internal quotations omitted). 
104 See infra notes 130–37 and accompanying text. 
105 See TREVOR SLACK & MILENA M. PARENT, UNDERSTANDING SPORT ORGA-
NIZATIONS: THE APPLICATION OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 40 (2d ed. 2006). 
106 Leagues have revenue sharing schemes that distribute league profits 
amongst teams. See CONRAD, supra note 4, at 15, 147–48, 171. 
107 NFL commissioner Roger Goodell’s actions regarding the suspension of 
Ray Rice for domestic violence and his handling of the “DeflateGate” scandal 
brought Goodell an incredible amount of criticism. See Juliet Macur, Ray Rice 
Ruling Highlights Roger Goodell’s Missteps, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/sports/football/ray [https://perma.cc/6E56-AEJX]; 
Sally Jenkins, DeflateGate Exposed Roger Goodell as Unfit to Serve His Office, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins 
/deflategate-exposed-roger-goodell-as-unfit-to-serve-his-office/2015/09/03/6b1a 
0688-5267-11e5-8c19-0b6825aa4a3a_story.html [https://perma.cc/R2ME-H6HV]. 
Still, all thirty-two league owners support Goodell, primarily because of the 
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Further, the policies league owners pursue indicate that they 
already operate in a profit-maximizing manner.108 For example, 
one of the primary functions of a league office is to promote com-
petitive balance amongst the league’s teams.109 The rationale behind 
creating a competitively balanced league stems from the “uncer-
tainty of outcome” hypothesis, which theorizes that more compet-
itive leagues engender greater interest, leading to an increase in 
revenue.110 In order to create a balanced environment, each of the 
four major professional sports leagues has adopted a revenue 
sharing system whereby revenues of the most profitable teams 
are partially redistributed to less profitable teams in order to increase 
the ability of poorer teams to sign high-caliber, talented players.111 
Additionally, each of the four major professional sports leagues, 
with the exception of the MLB, employs a salary cap, which limits 
the amount of money any one team may spend on player salaries.112 
In total, a league office acts as a profit-maximizer, not a win-
maximizer.113 As a result, unlike individual team owners, league 
offices already operate in a manner that adheres to the fiduciary 
duty of care.114 
                                                                                                            
overall success of the league under his reign. See Ben Volin, Why Do NFL Own-
ers Still Back Rodger Goodell as Commissioner?, BOS. GLOBE (July 25, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/07/24/commissioner-roger-goodell-job 
-money-bank/Fp5z6XtINLsEcoMQzBO1QI/story.html [https://perma.cc/FB8Z 
-A9WF]. 
108 See, e.g., James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: 
Sports Antitrust Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 
521–26 (2011). 
109 See id. 
110 See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 31, at 21 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
111 See John Vrooman, Theory of the Perfect Game: Competitive Balance in 
Monopoly Sports Leagues, 34 REV. INDUS. ORG. 5, 6 (2009). 
112 See id. at 7. The NFL and NHL use a hard cap, where every team is 
forbidden from surpassing a set number for player salaries. See id. at 21–22. 
On the other hand, the NBA uses the more lenient soft cap, which allows teams 
to surpass the salary cap in a number of different, well-defined scenarios. See 
id. at 19. For more information on the NBA’s salary cap exceptions, see Jorge 
Castillo, NBA Free Agency: Salary Cap Exceptions Explained, WASH. POST 
(July 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010 
/07/02/AR2010070202011.html [https://perma.cc/Z54R-38ZB]. 
113 See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
114 See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (stating that fiduciary duties are satisfied by promoting value). 
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2. Duty of Loyalty 
Whereas individual franchises that go public may expose 
themselves to liability stemming from a breach of their duty of loy-
alty,115 a public league office is much more unlikely to face liability 
stemming from a breach of its duty of loyalty.116 
First, as discussed above, directors of NUAs in some states al-
ready owe a duty of loyalty to the organization as well as to the 
other members of the NUA.117 Armed with knowledge of potential 
liability in the event that they are in a jurisdiction that holds that 
NUAs must operate as fiduciaries, leagues already have incentive 
to act in accordance with a duty of loyalty.118 
Second, due to the immense public scrutiny that league com-
missioners face,119 leagues may already be acting in accordance 
with a duty of loyalty.120 Under scrutiny from the twenty-four-hour 
sports media and millions of sports fans,121 leagues must already 
be careful about partaking in any action that may garner negative 
press.122 On the other hand, team owners, comparatively, live much 
                                                                                                            
115 See Lentze, supra note 80, at 85; see also supra notes 102–04 and accom-
panying text. 
116 See Lentze, supra note 80, at 80 (noting that the league office is both 
independent and impartial). 
117 See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text. 
119 See, e.g., Sean Gregory, Roger Goodell’s Worst Words, TIME (Dec. 10, 
2014), http://time.com/3629318/roger-goodell-nfl-rice-testimony/ [https://perma.cc 
/9BBC-2ZNN] (describing the NFL and Commissioner Goodell as under “the 
most intense public scrutiny the NFL has ever seen”); Matt Norlander, David 
Stern Greeted by Boos at His Final NBA Draft As Commissioner, CBS SPORTS 
(June 27, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/eye-on-basketball/22550795/david 
-stern-greeted-by-boos-at-his-final-nba-draft-as-commissioner [https://perma.cc 
/A9VY-RVC9] (reporting that former NBA Commissioner David Stern, who held 
the position for thirty years, was booed by fans at his final NBA draft despite 
the fact that his reign as commissioner was “undeniably successful”). 
120 See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
121 See HANDBOOK OF SPORTS AND MEDIA 70 (Arthur A. Raney & Jennings 
Bryant eds., 2009) (describing how the media’s constant coverage of sports has 
resulted in the “Benign Viewer Factor,” meaning that, in today’s world, every-
one has some knowledge of the latest current events in sports because “knowledge 
of sport is one of the important currencies of interpersonal communication.”). 
122 Shaun Powell, The Perils of Power, SPORTS ON EARTH (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/39035706/ [https://perma.cc/FVL2-DLCL] 
(noting that league commissioners have become “public pin cushion[s]” for criticism). 
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more private lives,123 meaning it is simply easier for their actions 
to fly under the radar.124 Therefore, due to the careful watch of 
the public eye, league commissioners are simply much less able 
to participate in the sort of self-interested transactions or usurp-
ing of corporate opportunities as compared to individual team 
owners, lest they subject themselves to twenty-four-hour scandal 
coverage by the sports media.125 
III. THE BENEFITS OF A PROFESSIONAL SPORTS  
LEAGUE GOING PUBLIC 
A. Corporate Governance 
1. Elimination of the Collective Action Problem 
By organizing as a corporation with a unified board of directors, 
sports leagues could rid themselves of the collective action prob-
lems that hamper their success.126 A collective action problem oc-
curs when “it is in individuals’ self-interest not to contribute to a 
group activity even though all of the individuals would be better 
off if everyone were to contribute.”127 Consequently, “each indi-
vidual is made worse off by pursuing her own self-interest.”128 In 
the context of professional sports leagues, the requirement that 
                                                                                                            
123 Some owners prefer remaining in the background; others are quite the 
opposite. Compare Peter Bella, Rocky Wirtz: The Quiet Man Deserves His Due, CHI. 
NOW (June 15, 2015, 10:51 PM), http://www.chicagonow.com/interesting-chicago 
/2015/06/rocky-wirtz-the-quiet-man-deserves-his-due/ [https://perma.cc/68LT 
-ZKGU] (describing Chicago Blackhawks majority owner Rocky Wirtz as “faceless 
and nameless”), with Tim MacMahon, Cuban Era Has Been Anything but Boring, 
ESPN (Jan. 5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/dallas/columns/story?columnist 
=macmahon_tim&id=4793301 [https://perma.cc/5ZU8-JMXN] (discussing Dallas 
Mavericks owner Mark Cuban’s rise as a prominent public figure and love of 
the limelight). 
124 See Bella, supra note 123 (noting that despite an owner having “put ex-
citement back into Chicago hockey,” he remains relatively unknown and under 
the radar). 
125 See HANDBOOK OF SPORTS AND MEDIA, supra note 121, at 70–71. 
126 James B. Perrine, Media Leagues: Australia Suggests New Professional 
Sports Leagues for the Twenty-First Century, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 703, 785 
(2002). 
127 Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Prob-
lems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2007). 
128 Id. at 73. 
 
564 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:545 
most actions, such as accepting a new broadcasting deal or ex-
panding the league, require a supermajority vote of the owners 
creates a collective action problem because (1) franchise owners 
have an incentive to “hold-out” from supporting initiatives that 
benefit the league at large but harm their individual franchise, 
and (2) unsophisticated owners may lack the business acumen to 
identify and make efficient business decisions.129 
First, franchise owners are likely to be swayed by the economic 
interests of their individual franchise, which may not be congru-
ent with the economic interests of the league as a whole.130 For 
example, Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos sternly fought 
the plan to relocate a MLB franchise to neighboring Washington, 
D.C., fearing that the new franchise would pull from the Orioles’s 
fan base.131 Angelos conceded to the relocation—and the Wash-
ington Nationals came into existence—only once he received an 
enormously one-sided offer: the creation of a new sports television 
channel to televise Orioles and Nationals games in which the Ori-
oles would retain an initial 90 percent ownership interest, with 
the Nationals’s interest slowly increasing on a yearly basis until 
it reaches a mere 33 percent.132 Considering the fact that the MLB 
owned the Nationals at the time of their relocation,133 the league 
was effectively paying Angelos a portion of the league’s potential 
revenues.134 Angelos’s actions represent the ability of a single voting 
                                                                                                            
129 Roger G. Noll, Major League Sports, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRY 381–82 (Walter Adams ed., 6th ed. 1982). 
130 Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 604 
(7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (“There is, however, no reason to expect 
that the current team owners will necessarily make ... decisions efficiently, given 
their individual economic interests in the financial health of their own teams.”). 
131 Steve Fainaru, Angelos, Selig Last Men Standing in D.C.’s Way, WASH. 
POST (June 29, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A133 
86-2004Jun28.html [https://perma.cc/Q78U-2SNZ] (quoting ex-MLB executive 
council member Claude Brochu: “[Angelos] could say, ‘Don’t screw me,’ and I 
think everybody would listen to what he would have to say, just because he 
would be a partner.”). 
132 Jonah Keri, For The Birds, GRANTLAND (Feb. 5, 2014), http://grantland.com 
/features/baltimore-orioles-offseason-spending-al-east/ [https://perma.cc/UP4Y 
-W8XJ]. 
133 Id. 
134 Jayson Stark, MLB Lays Out Incentive Plan for Angelos, EPSN (Sept. 28, 
2004), http://www.espn.com/mlb/columns/story?id=1888266 [https://perma.cc 
/2MGZ-GYYR] (noting that MLB will make up the difference in the event of 
revenue shortfall). 
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member to “hold … out” and prevent or otherwise hinder a league 
from taking an efficient action.135 The only actions that a league 
will ultimately adopt are those that benefit a supermajority of 
owners, rather than those that, on average, benefit the league as 
a whole.136 As a result, holding out impedes innovation and leads 
leagues to adopt conservative agendas due to an inability to upset 
the status quo.137 
Second, members of each league’s board of governors, with the 
exception of the MLB, are made up of one representative, usually 
the owner,138 from each team.139 However, there is no guarantee 
that the board of governors will be comprised of educated, rational 
businessmen who are likely to make good decisions.140 Conse-
quently, each innovative idea “must appeal to some entrepreneurs 
of below-average vision and ability.”141 Compounding the problem 
is that franchise owners tend to be “risk-averse billionaires.”142 
Together, a lack of business acumen and an overly conservative 
approach leads to inefficiency, as leagues miss out on new, inno-
vative ideas.143 
A solution to this collective action problem is a single, unified 
board of directors acting for the betterment of the league at 
large.144 No board member would be tempted to hold the league 
hostage for his own franchise’s interests because no board member 
                                                                                                            
135 Noll, supra note 129, at 382. 
136 Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Play-
ers, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 551 (1997). 
137 See Noll, supra note 129, at 382. 
138 See Lentze, supra note 80, at 69. 
139 See id. 
140 Noll, supra note 129, at 381. 
141 Id. at 382. 
142 Felix Gillette & Ira Boudway, Roger Goodell at the 50-50 Yard Line, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles 
/2014-09-18/roger-goodells-nfl-commissioner-job-security-is-up-to-team-owners 
[https://perma.cc/3CDZ-P374] (describing why NFL owners will refuse to re-
move Roger Goodell despite his shortcomings). 
143 Id.  
144 Perrine, supra note 126, at 783 (“[A] single firm will establish the objec-
tives of the enterprise and have the power to direct the actions required to obtain 
these goals. The absence of multiple firms in the management hierarchy ... will 
greatly reduce the ‘below-average visionary’ and ‘holdout’ problems common to 
innovation in traditional leagues.”). 
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would have an economic interest in any one team.145 Additionally, 
the board, presumably made up of corporate professionals with the 
requisite vision and ability to direct a large-scale corporation, 
would not be held back by owners who do not possess such exper-
tise; therefore, the league would be much more likely to adopt 
more efficient policies, rather than retain the status quo.146 
2. CEO Accountability to the Board 
Today, league commissioners have an immense amount of job 
security, with their average tenure being far greater than the av-
erage large company CEO.147 This job security is not necessarily 
well-deserved, as evidenced by Roger Goodell’s tumultuous nine-
year reign as NFL Commissioner.148 
Part of the problem may be that sports commissioners have 
too much power.149 While a board of directors oversees the actions 
of their CEO, a league’s owners do not oversee the actions of their 
commissioner.150 This places the Commissioner in an unusual 
scenario, for although “the Commissioner acts as an employee of 
the league, [he] is not under the control and supervision of [his] 
own employer.”151 Further, because each league’s board of governors 
                                                                                                            
145 Even if a team owner was voted onto the league’s board of directors, it 
would be difficult for that owner to avoid a duty of loyalty violation, as he would 
often be swayed towards participating in self-interested transactions that benefit 
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suffers from a collective action problem in which owners have in-
centive to “hold out” or may lack business acumen,152 it is difficult 
to meet the supermajority of votes necessary for commissioner re-
moval.153 Again, as a result, leagues are conservative and elect to 
retain the status quo.154 
Adopting a corporate structure, with the commissioner as CEO, 
would mitigate some of the negative consequences of the current 
model.155 Lacking a collective action problem, the league’s board 
of directors would make well-informed, unified decisions in pur-
suit of established goals.156 Additionally, when crafting its bylaws, 
the league could elect to give its board of directors the power to 
remove the commissioner by a simple majority vote.157 The league’s 
board of directors would then have the power to hold the commis-
sioner personally accountable for any missteps.158 With a unified 
vision and an accountable, competent commissioner, the league 
would be better able to successfully pursue the type of efficient 
behavior that shareholders prefer.159 
B. Limitless Opportunity for Capital 
A primary reason that companies choose to go public is the 
large amount of capital available through an IPO.160 In 2014, 244 
IPOs brought in gross revenue of 74.4 billion dollars, with nine 
IPOs each bringing in over one billion dollars.161 In recent years, 
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the IPOs of companies such as Alibaba ($25 billion), Visa ($17.9 
billion), Facebook ($16 billion), and General Motors ($15.8 billion) 
were some of the largest of all time.162 Further, a publicly traded 
professional sports league would have ongoing access to capital 
beyond the time of the IPO.163 The benefit of liquidity makes in-
vestors more likely to invest, and, if the league needed a substantial 
sum of money for an acquisition or investment, the league would 
have the option of conducting a secondary offering.164 
1. Stadiums 
The sports world has experienced an explosion of new, luxurious 
sports stadiums.165 Since the early 1990s, 90 percent of all Amer-
ican sports teams have replaced their stadiums, and, on average, 
five new facilities are built each year.166 As stadiums continue to 
be built at an unprecedented rate,167 teams seek to “one-up” other 
new stadiums, leading to a rapidly increasing cost as each team 
seeks to establish the new “gold standard” of stadiums.168 To il-
lustrate the rapid growth in the cost of new stadiums, plans from 
the late 1990s estimated the total cost of new stadiums for the 
Baltimore Ravens and Cleveland Browns to be $229 million and 
$315 million, respectively.169 In comparison, the new home of the 
Dallas Cowboys opened in 2011 at a cost of $1.2 billion,170 and the 
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new Minnesota Vikings stadium opened in 2016 at a cost of $1.1 
billion.171 
In order to finance the building of a new stadium, team owners 
turn to the public, on average requesting that the local municipality 
bear between 30 and 60 percent of the total cost.172 Team owners and 
the public officials who support public financing of the stadium 
propagate two central rationales for allowing the team to use pub-
lic funds: (1) without funding for a new stadium, the team will 
leave for a new city, and (2) a new stadium will kick-start eco-
nomic rejuvenation in the areas surrounding the new location.173 
Whereas the threat of relocation if public officials are unwilling 
to strike a deal may be real,174 the prediction that a new stadium will 
bring economic benefits to the city is largely false.175 Officials and 
team owners often try to persuade the public that a new stadium 
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will provide economic growth by funding studies estimating a 
high economic impact.176 However, economists have nearly unan-
imously found that there is no causal connection between a new 
sports stadium and economic growth.177 In fact, one study found 
that out of thirty cities with new stadiums, twenty-seven of those 
stadiums had no impact, with the final three negatively affecting 
the local economy.178 
Further, there is cause for concern that taxpayers may be less 
willing to fund new stadiums in the future.179 There is evidence to 
suggest that, after being fooled once, the public becomes doubtful 
as to the legitimacy of the economic growth argument.180 Specifi-
cally, one study found that in cities with two new sports stadiums, 
advocators pushed the economic growth argument regarding the 
first stadium, but they abandoned the argument when pushing 
for the second stadium.181 This suggests that local taxpayers are 
catching on to the fact that a new stadium will not bring economic 
growth.182 Additionally, this removes one of the new stadium ad-
vocates’ two central arguments for why the public should provide 
assistance in financing the construction of the new stadium.183 
One recent trend may be illustrative of the future of the eco-
nomic growth argument.184 In recent years, taxpayers in several 
U.S. cities have rejected hosting the Olympic Games mostly due 
to the significant financial burden it would place on the taxpayers 
in order to construct the facilities necessary for the Games.185 
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Public disapproval of financing such stadiums due to taxation 
concerns may signal to future public officials that voters could be 
similarly unlikely to support new stadiums for their local 
teams.186 Without voter and public official support for public fi-
nancing, team owners would have to look elsewhere to find the 
large amount of capital necessary to construct a new stadium. 
A solution to this problem would be to finance new stadiums us-
ing the capital obtained from an IPO.187 First, this would remove 
payment for the stadium from the hands of the taxpayer—who 
may not be a sports fan at all, much less a fan of the team—to the 
hands of those who have made the voluntary choice to invest in 
the league.188 Second, this may lead to a more efficient use of sta-
diums.189 No longer would owners, who know that the public will 
bear a significant portion of the cost,190 replace usable or repaira-
ble stadiums with an entirely new facility.191 Rather, a corporate 
league office would focus on maximizing its return on investment 
when constructing a new sports stadium.192 Consequently, the fo-
cus would likely shift to building long-lasting stadiums rather 
than the overly expensive and short-lived stadiums of today.193 
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2. Worldwide Expansion 
An increasingly globalized world has exposed American sports 
to new fans all over the planet.194 As a result, expansion to and 
involvement in the international market is a top priority of the 
four major professional sports leagues, with each league adopting 
methods to expand its popularity and grow its fan base overseas.195 
For example, in the 2013 NBA season, teams played games in 
Brazil, the United Kingdom, China, the Philippines, Spain, Taiwan, 
and Turkey.196 The NBA Finals were broadcasted in 215 countries 
and forty-seven languages.197 Similarly, NFL teams played games 
in London and are interested in playing games in Mexico, Germany, 
Canada, China, and Brazil in the near future.198 The MLB has 
played season-opener games in Monterrey, Mexico (1999), San 
Juan, Puerto Rico (2001), Tokyo, Japan (2000 and 2004), and has 
even opened a Tokyo office.199 The MLB has also created the World 
Baseball Classic—a kind of “World Cup” of baseball—which has 
been widely considered a success.200 
Additionally, three of the four major professional sports 
leagues have found themselves in a de facto arms race as to which 
league will be the first to open a permanent franchise located out-
side the United States or Canada.201 The NFL hopes to open a 
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London franchise by 2022.202 MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred has 
listed Monterrey, Mexico as a potential destination,203 and others 
speculate that the easing of relations between the United States 
and baseball-obsessed Cuba may lead the MLB to expand to Cuba.204 
NBA Commissioner Adam Silver has gone as far as to say it is the 
NBA’s “manifest destiny” to expand to Europe, although he ad-
mits expansion overseas is not in the NBA’s immediate future.205 
Despite each leagues’ immense popularity in the United States, 
garnering enough interest to validate placing an expansion team 
overseas will be a difficult task.206 Mark Reeves, International Com-
mercial Director for the NFL, has equated the task of engendering 
enough overseas support to justify expansion into Europe to “push-
ing [a] boulder up [a] mountain.”207 However, this is a boulder that 
a publicly traded NFL, with an immense amount of capital gained 
through an IPO, could likely push singlehandedly.208 The NFL, or 
any of the power four leagues, would have access to enough capi-
tal to build the kind of state-of-the-art stadium that would stir 
the surrounding communities’ interest in the new team.209 Start-
up costs could be borne not by the taxpayers of the international 
expansion location (who, it seems, would be unwilling to finance 
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building a stadium for a sport they know little about), but by the 
league itself.210 
Further, current league policies reduce the incentive for po-
tential owners to undertake a risky venture like opening a team 
overseas.211 Expansion and relocation fees—amounts new teams 
pay equally to each already-existing team in the league—have 
grown rapidly.212 The St. Louis Rams’s relocation cost them $550 
million in such fees, and the San Diego Chargers’ planned reloca-
tion may cost them $650 million.213 Additionally, potential new 
owners will be cautioned by the failings of the four major leagues’ 
only overseas expansion effort—NFL Europa.214 NFL Europa, a 
ten team developmental league that the NFL opened in 1991,215 
operated at a loss for fifteen straight years before shutting down 
in 2007.216 Considering the combination of the immense expan-
sion fee and the uncertain success of an American sports league 
team in an international market, a sports league may find itself 
hard-pressed to find a potential owner willing to purchase an in-
ternational expansion team.217 Again, this problem can be solved 
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through financing the expansion team by a publicly traded sports 
league.218 As discussed above, these leagues—unlike an individual 
potential new owner—believe that expansion is their “manifest 
destiny,”219 and they are much less likely to be concerned with an 
expansion fee or the riskiness of international expansion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note outlines the various reasons why a professional sports 
league would stand to benefit from organizing as a publicly traded 
corporation. While individual franchises have flirted with the con-
cept of going public—including several launching IPOs—the corpo-
rate model is much more applicable to an entire league rather than 
a singular franchise. Unlike a publicly traded team, which may 
be more likely to breach their duty of care by operating as a win-
maximizer, leagues are focused entirely on profits. Further, the 
constant attention and scrutiny garnered by professional sports limit 
the ability of leagues to breach their duty of loyalty by engaging 
in self-interest doctrines or by usurping corporate opportunities. 
While in the current model leagues suffer from a collective ac-
tion problem and a lack of commissioner accountability, a publicly 
traded sports league solves those problems. By creating a unified 
board of directors with a singular, clear vision for the future of 
the enterprise, leagues will become more flexible and better able 
to make the efficient decisions necessary to best serve the inter-
ests of the league.220 
Additionally, a publicly traded league would gain an immense 
amount of capital via its IPO.221 This capital would allow the 
league to finance building new stadiums for its franchise, which 
is of particular importance as evidence suggests that taxpayers 
will begin to refuse to provide owners with funds for new stadi-
ums in the future. It would also allow leagues to accomplish an 
important—and expensive—goal: overseas expansion.222 
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While a novel idea, it is somewhat difficult to imagine one of 
the four major professional sports leagues abandoning their cur-
rent model.223 This is not because the corporate model is not a 
viable (or better) option, but because owners and commissioners 
stand to lose a substantial amount of power via the internal 
checks and balances—as well as shareholder elections—that the 
corporate model provides.224 Still, as leagues and owners look to 
maximize efficiency and capital in order to finance future initia-
tives, it is a viable alternative. 
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